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ABSTRACT 
Until now, the main way to assess whether a patient is conscious or not is to observe what he 
can do spontaneously or in response to stimulation. Although there is a growing body of 
research on the subject, detecting oriented/voluntary responses is still extremely challenging. 
Motor, verbal, and cognitive impairments; fluctuations of vigilance; and medications with impact 
on the central nervous system are among the factors complicating the diagnosis. Establishing a 
proper diagnosis is nevertheless of high clinical relevance when considering patients’ prognosis 
and treatment. In this review, we will characterize the behavioral patterns of the various levels 
of consciousness, we will explain how challenging it is to detect signs of consciousness, and 
which tools currently exist to help in the assessment of those signs. Secondarily, we will present 
preliminary data investigating the interest of various sensory modalities in determining the 
diagnosis of patients with severe brain injury. 
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Some patients surviving extensive brain damage only regain limited levels of consciousness. 
Until now, the main way to assess whether a patient is conscious or not is to observe what 
he/she can do spontaneously or in response to stimulation. Although there is a growing body of 
research on the subject, detecting oriented/voluntary responses is still extremely challenging. 
Motor, verbal, and cognitive impairments; fluctuations of vigilance; and medications with impact 
on the central nervous system are among the factors complicating the diagnosis. Establishing a 
proper diagnosis is nevertheless of high clinical relevance. Conscious and unconscious patients 
have different outcomes. Patients in a minimally conscious state have a better long-term 
prognosis compared to those in a vegetative state [1]. Twelve months after brain injury, about 
half of the patients in minimally conscious state improve and show a good functional outcome, 
whereas only a very small percentage (3 %) of patients in vegetative state do so [2]. The 
diagnosis also has an impact on the patients’ daily care and therapeutic choices when it comes to 
the administration of pharmacological interventions such as pain medication or new non-
pharmacological interventions such as neurostimulation (deep brain stimulation or transcranial 
direct current stimulation) [3,4]. Finally, regarding end-of-life decisions, previous legal cases in 
several countries have established the right of the medical team to withdraw artificial nutrition 
and hydration in patients diagnosed as being in a vegetative state [5]. In such context, a correct 
diagnosis is therefore crucial. In this review, we will characterize the behavioral pattern of the 
various levels of consciousness, we will explain how challenging it is to detect signs of 
consciousness, and which tools currently exist to help in the assessment of those signs. 
Secondarily, we will also present preliminary data investigating the interest of various sensory 
modalities in determining the diagnosis of patients with severe brain injury. 
3.2 Behavioral Pattern in Disorders of Consciousness 
When the patient is in a coma, there is no arousal and no consciousness. During this transient 
condition, patients’ eyes are continuously closed (even following stimulation), autonomic 
functions are reduced, and respiratory assistance is needed [6] (Table 3.1). Most patients 
recover from a coma within hours to weeks after injury. However, some patients can recover 
arousal (i.e., open their eyes spontaneously or in response to stimulation) without being 
conscious (no oriented/voluntary responses). These patients are in a state called “vegetative 
state” (VS) [7] (Table 3.1). In this state, breathing occurs without assistance since autonomic 
functions (e.g., cardiovascular regulation, thermoregulation) are preserved. The patients may 
also moan, demonstrate smiling, crying, or grimacing even though inappropriate and appearing 
out of context [7, 8]. This state can be either transient or persistent (when above a month post-
injury). After a year for traumatic etiologies and 3 months for nontraumatic etiologies, the VS 
can be considered as permanent. These patients have, in that case, less than 5 % of chances to 
recover. Only then, the ethical and legal issues around withdrawal of hydration and nutrition 
may be discussed [9]. Note that, given the negative connotation of the term “vegetative state,” 
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The European Task Force on Disorders of Consciousness has recently proposed to use the more 
neutral and descriptive term “unresponsive wakefulness syndrome” (VS/UWS) [10]. 
Consciousness recovery consists of regaining fluctuating but reproducible nonreflexive-oriented 
and/or voluntary behaviors. Such state is called the “minimally conscious state” (MCS) [11] 
(Table 3.1). Behaviors that suggest consciousness are, for example, command following, visual 
pursuit, object localization, or contingent responses to emotional stimuli. MCS has recently been 
divided into two categories, MCS+ (plus) and MCS- (minus), based on the complexity of 
behavioral responses. Patients in an MCS- show nonreflexive-oriented responses such as visual 
pursuit or localization to noxious stimuli, while MCS+ refers to patients showing nonreflexive 
voluntary responses such as command following, intelligible verbalization, and/or nonfunctional 
communication [12, 13]. When patients demonstrate reliable “functional communication” (i.e., 
accurate yes-no responses to situational orientation questions) or “functional object use” (i.e., 
appropriate use of different common objects) on two consecutive assessments, the patient is 
considered to have emerged from the MCS (EMCS) [11] (Table 3.1). After emerging from MCS, 
these patients are not considered as being in a disorder of consciousness anymore. However, 
they often remain confused, disoriented, and sometimes agitated. The term “acute confusional 
state” (ACS) has recently been used to describe these patients [14]. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of the behavioral features for coma, VS/UWS, MCS-, MCS+, and emergence from MCS 
Level of consciousness Behavioral features 
Coma No arousal/eye opening 
Impaired spontaneous breathing/brainstem reflexes 
No oriented or purposeful behaviors 
No groans, vocalizations, or verbalizations 




Arousal/spontaneous or stimulus-induced eye opening 
Preserved spontaneous breathing/brainstem reflexes 
No oriented or purposeful behaviors 
Groans and/or vocalizations but no verbalizations 
No language comprehension/response to command 
Minimally conscious state Fluctuation of vigilance (MCS-/+) 
Preserved spontaneous breathing/brainstem reflexes 
MCS-: object localization-reaching-manipulation and/or sustained visual fixation and/or 
visual pursuit and/or automatic motor behavior and/or localization to pain 
MCS+: command following and/or object recognition and/or intelligible verbalization 
and/or intentional communication Emergence: functional communication and/or 
functional object use on at least two consecutive assessments 
3.3 Misdiagnosis 
Differentiating MCS from VS/UWS can be challenging since voluntary and reflexive behaviors 
can be difficult to distinguish and subtle signs of consciousness may be missed. The development 
of diagnostic criteria for MCS [11] would reasonably be expected to reduce the incidence of 
misdiagnosis relative to the rates reported before these criteria were established [15, 16]. 
However, recent studies found that around 40 % of patients believed to be in VS/UWS were still 
misdiagnosed [17,18] (Fig. 3.1). 
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The high rate of misdiagnosis likely reflects different sources of variance. Variance in diagnostic 
accuracy may result from biases contributed by the examiner, the environment, and/or the 
patient. First, examiner errors may arise when the range of behaviors sampled is too narrow, 
response-time windows are over- or under- inclusive, criteria for judging purposeful responses 
are poorly defined, and exami-nations are conducted too infrequently to capture the full range of 
behavioral fluctuation. The use of standardized rating scales offers some protection from these 
errors, although failure to adhere to specific administration and scoring guidelines may 
jeopardize diagnostic accuracy. Second, the environment in which the patient is evaluated may 
bias assessment findings. Paralytic and sedative medications, restricted range of movement 
stemming from restraints and immobilization techniques, poor positioning, and excessive 
ambient noise/heat/light can decrease or distort voluntary behavioral responses. The last 
source of variance concerns the patient. Fluctuations in arousal level, fatigue, subclinical seizure 
activity, occult illness, pain, cortical sensory deficits (e.g., cortical blindness/deafness), motor 
impairment (e.g., generalized hypotonus, spasticity, or paralysis), or cognitive deficits (e.g., 
aphasia, apraxia, agnosia) constitute a bias to the behavioral assessment and therefore decrease 
the probability to observe signs of consciousness. 
Some sources of error can be avoided, but this is not always possible or within the examiner’s 
control. It is, however, particularly crucial to optimize the way consciousness assessments are 
performed as clinical management, from treatment of pain to end-of-life decision-making, often 
depends on behavioral observations. For this reason, the use of standardized and sensitive 
behavioral scales can substantially help clinicians to detect subtle signs of consciousness. 
Fig. 3.1: Previous findings on misdiagnosis rate in patients with severe brain injury 
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3.4 Clinical Assessment of Disorders of Consciousness 
Behavioral assessment is based on two main components: wakefulness and awareness. 
Wakefulness refers to the patient’s level of arousal and is assessed by observing eye opening. 
Awareness is related to subjective experiences and can be subdivided into awareness of the 
external world (i.e., perception of the environment or “consciousness”) and awareness of the 
internal world (i.e., stimulus-independent thoughts such as mental imagery and inner speech or 
“self-awareness”). Raters assessing patients with severe brain injury will mainly assess 
consciousness of the environment, since self-awareness is difficult to evaluate when only based 
on bedside observations and not on patients’ report. The assessment of consciousness can be 
done through repeated examinations revealing reproducible, oriented, or voluntary behavioral 
responses to various stimuli (the most common being auditory, verbal, and motor stimuli). The 
first scale widely used and known for assessing severely brain-injured patients recovering from 
coma is the Glasgow coma scale (GCS) [19]. This scale is short and can easily be incorporated 
into routine clinical care. Despite its widespread use, the GCS has been criticized for fluctuant 
inter-rater reliability and problems of scoring in patients with ocular trauma, tracheostomy, or 
ventilatory support [20]. The Full Outline of UnResponsiveness (FOUR) has been developed to 
replace the GCS for assessing severely brain-injured patients in intensive care [21]. The scale 
includes four subscales assessing motor and ocular responses, brainstem reflexes, and 
breathing. The total score ranges from 0 to 16. Unlike the GCS, the FOUR does not assess verbal 
functions to accommodate the high number of intubated patients in intensive care. It also 
assesses brainstem reflexes and breathing and, therefore, helps to better monitor comatose and 
VS/UWS patients. The FOUR also tracks emergence from VS/ UWS since it includes the 
assessment of early signs of consciousness such as visual pursuit. The scale is globally more 
sensitive than the GCS for diagnosing MCS but like the GCS is not adapted to a rehabilitation 
setting. 
Since the 1970s, a high number of scales have been validated for being used in subacute and 
chronic patients with severe brain injury (Table 3.2). Recently, the American Congress of 
Rehabilitation Medicine (ACRM) has conducted a systematic evidence-based review of the 
available scales to provide recommendations for use according to validity, reliability, outcome 
prediction, and diagnostic sensitivity [22]. Among the scales evaluated, the Wessex Head Injury 
Matrix (WHIM) has been recommended with moderate reservations. The WHIM was developed 
to capture changes in patients in VS/UWS through emergence from post-traumatic amnesia [23]. 
This tool is particularly sensitive to detect changes in patients in MCS not captured by other 
scales such as the GCS. The WHIM has been structured according to the sequence of recovery 
observed in 88 patients recovering from traumatic brain injury. The scale assesses arousal level 
and concentration, visual pursuit, communication, cognition (i.e., memory and spatiotemporal 
orientation), and social behaviors. The WHIM score represents the rank of the most complex 
behavior observed. Despite a good validity, its reliability is still unproven, and, even though 
superior to the GCS, its diagnostic sensitivity is lower than other standardized scales such as the 
Coma Recovery Scale- Revised (CRS-R) [24]. In fact, according to the ACRM, the CRS-R is the 
most reliable tool for differentiating disorders of consciousness and received the strongest 
recommendation with minor reservations [22]. This scale was developed in 1991 and revised in 
2004. Its primary purpose is to differentiate VS/UWS from MCS and MCS from EMCS. It 
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measures auditory, visual, motor, and verbal functions as well as communication and arousal. 
Each of these subscales is hierarchically structured; the lowest scores reflect reflexive behaviors, 
while the highest scores indicate cognitively mediated behaviors. This scale has clear definitions 
for both the administration and the scoring of each item. The CRS-R can be administered reliably 
by trained examiners and produces reasonably stable scores over repeated assessments. 
Validity analyses have shown that the CRS-R is capable of discriminating patients in MCS from 
those in VS/UWS better than the GCS, the FOUR, and the WHIM [24]. 
Other scales such as the Western Neuro Sensory Stimulation Profile (WNSSP) [25], the Sensory 
Modality Assessment Technique (SMART) [26], and the Disorders of Consciousness Scale 
(DOCS) [27] have acceptable standardized administration and scoring procedures and have also 
been recommended with moderate reservations by the ACRM. On the contrary to the CRS-R 
whose main purpose is the diagnosis, the WNSSP, the SMART, and the DOCS are rather used 
when applying a sensory stimulation treatment to patients with severe brain injury. Sensory 
stimulation programs usually consist in presenting different types of environmental stimuli to 
the patient in order to optimize her/his consciousness level. These programs are supposed to 
constitute enriched environments which are supposed to enhance synaptic reinnervation, 
improve brain plasticity, and therefore accelerate the recovery from coma. However, even 
though numerous studies investigated the interest of these sensory stimulation programs, none 
of these studies has proven the efficacy of such treatment since the findings did not allow to 
differentiate spontaneous recovery from recovery due to treatment. Despite this, scales such as 
the WNSSP, the SMART, or the DOCS could still be interesting in a diagnostic context since they 
include the assessment of more sensory modalities than the CRS-R (i.e., tactile, olfactory, and 
gustatory modalities). The interest of those modalities for detecting signs of consciousness has 
nevertheless never been evaluated. 
 
Published in : M.M. Monti, W.G. Sannita (eds.), Brain Function and Responsiveness in 
Disorders of Consciousness (© Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2016), 
pp. 25-36 
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-21425-2_3 




Table 3.2: Behavioral responses assessed by scales developed for patients with disorders of consciousness 









Oriented response to sensory 
stimulation 
V N T O G 
Coma Recovery Scale-Revised [4] *  * * * *    
Western Neuro Sensory Stimulation Profile [25] * * * * *  * *  
Sensory Modality Assessment & Rehabilitation Technique 
[34] 
* * * * *  * * * 
Wessex Head Injury Matrix [23] * * * * *     
Disorder of Consciousness Scale [27] *   * *  * *  
Sensory Stimulation Assessment Measure [35] *  * * *  * * * 
Glasgow Coma Scale [19] *   *  *    
Reaction Level Scale [36] *   * * *    
Innsbruck Coma Scale [37]      *    
Glasgow-Liège Scale [38] *   *  *    
Full Outline of UnResponsiveness [21] *    * *    
Coma/Near-Coma Scale [39] *   * *  * *  
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3.5 Can More Sensory Modalities Increase Diagnostic 
Sensitivity? 
It has previously been shown that some sensory modalities are more sensitive to detect 
consciousness than others. In studies investigating misdiagnosis, oriented eye movements (i.e., 
visual pursuit and fixation) have been reported as the responses the most frequently missed 
during behavioral assessments [28, 17, 18]. In parallel, the visual modality of the CRS-R has been 
shown as the subscale allowing the highest detection of MCS as compared to the auditory, motor, 
or verbal modalities [29, 30]. Oriented visual responses are particularly interesting to detect 
since it is one of the first signs of consciousness appearing during patients’ recovery and as it is 
associated with good outcome [31, 32, 2]. Until now, no study has investigated the interest of 
other sensory modalities (such as tactile, olfactory, and gustatory) when assessing 
consciousness, even though several scales recommended by the ACRM include such modalities 
(Table 3.2). 
In a preliminary study, we therefore decided to investigate the interest of tactile, olfactory, and 
gustatory modalities in the assessment of consciousness. We assessed 38 patients (46 ± 16 
years old, 17 traumatic, 21 chronic) diagnosed as being in a VS/ UWS (n = 15) or in a MCS (n = 
23) by using the CRS-R. Tactile, olfactory, and gustatory stimuli used in the WNSSP, the SMART, 
and the DOCS have been administered in each patient in a randomized order. Tactile stimuli 
included tap on the shoulder, nasal swab, feather (applied on arms, fingers, and face), air into 
the neck, hair touching, vibration on the arm, scrub (i.e., kitchen scouring pad applied over the 
arm), and firm hand pressure on the arm. Each of these stimuli was applied for 10 s on both 
sides of the body on three consecutive trials. Olfactory stimuli included vinegar, syrup, and 
ammonia which were held under the patients’ nose for 10 s (patient’s mouth closed) on three 
consecutive trials. In case of tracheotomy, the entrance of the cannula was covered. Gustatory 
stimuli included vinegar and syrup. A stick soaked of this flavor was introduced into the 
patient’s mouth for 10 s on three consecutive trials. Several recommendations had to be 
followed such as applying the treatment while the patients were in a wakeful state with eyes 
open in a setting with minimal ambient noise and respecting a 30 min rest before each session 
(i.e., absence of nursing care). Oriented responses (e.g., eyes/head toward or away from the 
stimulus, hand toward or pushes away the stimulus, congruent facial expression, mouth opening, 
or tongue pumping) were considered as present when it was clear and reproducible, meaning it 
was observed at least two times to exclude reflexive behaviors. The oriented responses obtained 
using those tactile, olfactory, and gustatory stimulations have then been compared to the 
diagnosis obtained using the CRS-R. Patients’ outcome has also been collected at 1 year after 
assessment (n=27), using the Glasgow Outcome Scale (GOS) [33]. 
According to our results (Fig. 3.2), a minority of patients diagnosed as being in a VS/UWS by 
using the CRS-R showed oriented olfactory or gustatory responses (7 % and 14 %, respectively). 
The patient for whom we had outcome data (one missing data) did not recover consciousness a 
year after assessment. Additionally, oriented olfactory or gustatory responses were absent in a 
majority of patients diagnosed as being in a MCS by using the CRS-R (70 %) and in a majority of 
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patients who showed oriented eye movements (61 %). Using tactile stimuli, a higher percentage 
of patients diagnosed as being in a VS/UWS showed oriented responses (40 %). Oriented tactile 
responses were present in a majority of patients diagnosed as being in an MCS by using the CRS-
R (65 %) and in a majority of patients who showed oriented eye movements (83 %). When 
considering the stimulus leading to the most frequent oriented responses, the nasal swab helped 
to detect 80 % of the oriented tactile responses. However, only one of the VS/UWS patients 
showing oriented tactile responses recovered consciousness a year after assessment (17 %). 
The patient (50 years old, 50 days after nontraumatic injury) was able to localize a tactile 
stimulus using her hand. Repeated CRS-R assessments, at that time, showed only reflexive 
behaviors (i.e., auditory startle, blinking to threat, flexion to noxious stimulation, oral reflexive 
movements, and arousal with stimulation). Two years after our assessment, the CRS-R indicated 
an EMCS. Finally, to test whether the outcome measured by the GOS differs according to the 
presence or absence of an oriented response, U Mann-Whitney tests were performed. There was 
no statistical difference for olfactory (U= 51.5; p = 0.61), gustatory (U=49; p = 0.5), and tactile 
(U = 76.5; p = 0.51) modalities. 
Considering our data, oriented olfactory and gustatory responses do not seem to be linked to 
consciousness since they are not observed in the majority of significant proportion of conscious 
patients and since they are not associated with consciousness recovery. Oriented tactile 
responses seem to be observed in most conscious patients but are not clearly related to 
consciousness recovery and could be false positives. This preliminary study hence seems to 
indicate that adding sensory modalities such as olfactory, gustatory, or tactile modalities to the 
CRS-R does not constitute a further help for decreasing the level of misdiagnosis in patients with 
disorders of consciousness. 
Fig. 3.2: Percentage of oriented responses in VS/UWS and MCS patients (panel a) and outcome at 1 year 
(averaged Glasgow Outcome Score - GOS, with 95 % confidence intervals) according to the absence (0) or 
presence (1) of oriented responses (panel b) (“ns” indicates difference is nonsignificant (p >0.05)) 
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Establishing a proper diagnosis is very important in the care of patients with severe brain injury. 
However, clinical assessment is difficult and can often lead to a misdiagnosis of the level of 
consciousness. The use of sensitive standardized tools is therefore crucial when establishing the 
diagnosis. The CRS-R is currently the most reliable and valid scale available and constitutes a 
substantial help in the differentiation of conscious vs. unconscious patients. Finally, even though 
our findings need to be replicated in a bigger sample, using gustatory, olfactory, or tactile stimuli 
that are included in several behavioral scales for the assessment of disorders of consciousness 
do not seem to be of further help when detecting consciousness in patients with severe brain 
injury. 
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